Introduction

Corruption, in the present time, is receiving increasing attention by policy makers, citizens and donor agencies. The reasons for such attention is clear. There is now increasing realization about the ill-effects of corruption on society, polity and economy of a country. It is now evident that no country can be totally free from corruption. Unfortunately, the incidents of corruption is on increase specially in poor and underdeveloped countries. These countries given their social, political and economic backwardness can ill-afford the menace of corruption – both petty and grand – in this age of globalization. No country can be viable, let alone prosper, if its economy is not competitive and able to withstand the onslaught of market forces and greater consumer demands for efficient, timely and better products and service delivery.

In the above background it is imperative to undertake research and synthesize data on corruption. In spite of the tremendous importance of corruption in terms of its negative effect on the society as a whole very few attempts have been made to prepare bibliographies on the topic/area. But, of course, there are some notable exceptions.

Here one publication needs to be specifically mentioned. The details of the publication is : Inge Amundsen and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad (2000) Corruption : A Selected and Annotated Bibliography. Bergen : Chr. Michelsen Institute. The work was commissioned by NORAD.

This article presents a review of recent developments in the empirical literature on corruption which uses subjective indices and survey data. The results are presented on two board themes : contributions to understanding the causes of corruption and theories on the consequences of corruption.

There are three main proposals. The first can be termed as the economist's approach and consists of diluting the value of the central rights of bureaucrats by increasing the level of competition in the economy. It is based on the observation often made by the economists that it is hard to imagine corrupt activities taking place in situations of perfect competition.

The second approach is based on raising the deterrence provided by the legal system by increasing the probability of detection, apprehension and conviction and the penalties for malfeasant behaviour.

The third approach is the easier approach to control corruption which emphasize revising the wages of bureaucrats who have the discretion to engage in corrupt activities. Specially, they argue that bureaucrats should be given similar incentives and remunerations as their private sector equivalents.

They have found that corruption is higher in countries with economies dominated by a small number of firms or where domestic firms are sheltered from foreign competition by high tariffs. They also argue that corruption is higher in countries where judicial institutions are not well-developed, or are not independent on political influences. The effect of the independence of the judiciary on corruption is negative, though mild.

Many argue that corruption improves social welfare, both because it is a way to avoid cumbersome regulations and because it is a system of building in rewards for badly paid bureaucrats. But data indicate that corruption lowers investment, thereby leads to reduced growth.
Rather than giving definition of corruption this chapter identities some areas where it is more likely to manifest itself. These areas include: procurement of goods and services including award of contracts by the government; administration of taxes and prevention of smuggling, disposal, sale and allotment of government property including disinvestment of industries and other commercial units; administration of loans by public financial institutions; outright embezzlement of government fund; all kinds of shop-floor malpractices. There is no doubt that corruption hurts the economic performance of a country. The consequences of corruption are, among others: syphoning away a large chunk of public resources which could have been productively employed somewhere in the country; productivity, effectiveness and efficiency of the government are undermined by corruption; it reduces efficient mobilization of resources and management of development activities; gains through corruption are unlikely to be directed to investment in the industrial sector and are more likely to be either used up in conspicuous consumption or transferred to foreign bank accounts; corruption generates allocative inefficiency by permitting the least efficient contractor or most costly supplier with the highest ability to bribe those who award government constraints; bribes and pay-offs, instead of expediting decisions and facilitating movement of files do the opposite in an overwhelming number of cases because civil servants get into the habit of holding back all papers until some payment is made to them; once the system of bribery is well established income gained from bribes is not longer a windfall but becomes a part of expected wages and in addition to the award of contract for supplying, designing and construction by the public sector, much of the corruption in Bangladesh takes place in the external trade sector leading to over invoicing and under invoicing of imports and exports, and smuggling which in turn contributes to distortion in investment decisions and to capital flight.

This chapter also provides some measures for dealing with the governmental malpractices.

Democracy and open government are the two most effective ways of checking corruption. Democracy creates more favorable conditions for ensuring accountability of the executives where the people can exercise control, directly or indirectly, over the administrators.

An open system of government is the one where there is a constitutional and legal obligation on the government to disclose and make available all official documents which have progressed beyond a certain stage.

Accountability is the hallmark of a democratic system. The process can be divided into two stages. The first stage makes a public servant accountable to the politician; the second makes politicians accountable, though the representative system to the public at large. Accountability involves supplying the public with relevant information. There are a number of facets to the concept accountability which can broadly be broken down to issues pertaining to legal, political, administrative and financial accountability. Scope for malpractice in each of the areas and feasible measures for containing such practices are also discussed briefly in this chapter.


After political independence, five Philippine presidents created at least ten investigation and anti-graft agencies over a span of twenty-three years. On the whole, these presidential anti-graft agencies have not been effective. They were plagued by problems or organizational instability, frequent changes in leadership, political pressures in employee recruitment, public apathy, strained relationship with other branches and agencies of government and legal impediments. Non-governmental agencies such as church and sectarian organizations have operated on a limited scale but these have ceased to function effectively after the declaration of martial law.

The Philippine experience in the institution of anti-graft agencies has not proved effective in minimizing corruption in the government. Because the complexities of corruption require an equally complex web of interrelated political, social and administrative remedies. A corps of administrative elite, whose behaviour within and outside the bureaucracy reflects an internationalization of anti-corruption values...
is badly needed not only to initiate these short run measures but to serve as role models for other public officials as well.

This article describes the bureaucratic corruption in the Philippines from 1946 to 1979. By the 1950s bureaucratic corruption had become a major public issue which permeated the entire Philippine bureaucracy. The extensive network of corruption in the public sector ranged from petty fixers operating at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy, to mid-level officials taking undue advantage of their positions and extending to the elite whose profit from corrupt transactions with government ran into millions of pesos, but whose positions and powerful connections rendered them virtually untouchable by the law enforcement authorities. Dereliction of duty, bribery, engaging in frauds, illegal executions and truncations and misappropriation of public funds or property were regarded as criminal offenses of the public officials by the Philippines Penal Code. The corrupt public officials preyed on powerless and uninformed citizens.


One of the most striking feature of the bureaucracy is rampant corruption. The Annual Report of 1992 of the Bangladesh Bureau of Anti-Corruption compiled 11,384 cases of different types of corruption charges against public officials of different categories. A survey conducted in Dhaka city in 1992 revealed that 68.25 per cent of the respondents, i.e. household heads either directly or indirectly paid bribes at one point of time or another to get the job done. The data also indicated that most complaints of administrative corruption were against officials of the law-enforcing agencies, customs and income-tax department. The data further showed that: (a) the higher the level of bureaucracy the less the frequently but higher the amount of bribe; and (b) the lower the level of bureaucracy the higher the frequency but less the amount of bribe. Work ethics in administration depend to a great extent on the leadership, management process and effectiveness of training packages. The most important thing is establishing ethics and accountability in the public service is to introduce education on democracy.


Placing corruption in the context of state-society relations, the author offers an analytical model for comprehending its realities. She conceptualises corruption in terms of its relationship to: (i) power and authority, (ii) law and policy, and (iii) the public space. Distinguishing between types of corruption – viz., coercive, collusive and non-conjunctive – she indicates five major strategies which have been carefully utilised by its beneficiaries to promote and sustain the system of corruption in various contexts. These are: mystification, distancing, folklore, colonisation, and pacification. Efforts at eradicating corruption to be successful, she suggests, must address the task of diffusing the corruption – sustaining contexts and strategies.

Types of Corruption

Collusive Corruption: In collusive corruption, the corruptees are active participants and use corruption as an instrument of inducing the wrong gesture of action or inaction on the part of authorities, deriving benefits greater than the costs of corruption for themselves.

Coercive Corruption: Coercive corruption, however, is one-sided victimising. Corruption, forced upon the corruptee by those in authority.

Non-conjunctive Corruption: In the case of non-conjunctive corruption, it is noteworthy that the benefits obtained by the corrupt are obtained at the cost of some one, yet the victims are not aware of their victimisation.


The report placed primary emphasis on how to strengthen the central institutions of parliamentary democracy at national level in Bangladesh. Still the report contained a number of observations on corruption. Corruption appeared to be pervasive at nearly all levels. President Ershad during his rule established record levels of venality. But much of the corruption simply took the shape of petty rent seeking which collectively constituted a heavy burden on both the economy and
administrative efficiency. Also the statist vision of centralized command and control that insisted on locating most of the development enterprise within the public sector not only tolerated inefficiencies and waste but enabled lot of opportunities for corruption to proliferate and flourish at all levels. The report recommends establishment of an office of Ombudsman as provided in Article 77 of the Constitution to counter and check corruption.


To evolve a proper theoretical framework the author presents an interesting and comprehensive form of official corruption. As there are many varieties of corrupt behaviour so there are multitudinous factors contributing to corruption. The article reflects the wide variety of factors contributing to corruption which includes – ideological, external, economic, political, socio-cultural and technological. Despite the unevenness of research data several attempts at detecting generalized patterns of corruption among different geographical regions have been made corresponding to their relative wealth, political stability, social cohesion, cultural mores, administrative capability and degree of modernization. The author has described both the adverse and beneficial effects of corruption. Detailed case studies of specific corrupt practices have disproved most of the supposed benefits claimed for them. Caiden mentioned unchecked official corruption will result in a “softness of state” comprising all manner of social discipline that prevents effective government and obstructs national development. It is also impossible to eliminate corruption entirely, it can be minimized. Societies could be considerably better off if they could reduce official corruption.

To define official corruption Caiden has quoted the definition of Joseph & Nye’s behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private—regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence. Nye specifically mentioned bribery, nepotism and misappropriation as symptoms of deviant behaviour.

Official corruption is the specific act of misconduct that disgrace public office and make the offenders to remain in office. It stresses the behaviour element – intentional deviation for personal gain.
efficiency, technical, jurisdictional, propriety and secrecy norms. Carino also describes the norms of the culture. Personalism is in fact the most dominant symbolic feature of Philippines social behaviour. Because of the cultural imperatives a Filipino is expected to take account of all facets of an individual’s personality and membership in dealing with him. As he does so, he is also expected to treat persons according to the closeness or congruence of their group memberships and their other similarities to him. The bureaucratic legal norms lie a great distance from the demands of personalism. Personalism can be discordant in a bureaucracy where relations are supposed to be governed by constitutional rules and general interest rather than particularistic considerations.

The bureaucratic legal norms are in marked contrast with personalism which the culture demands. The incongruence between legal and culture standards is such that what are deemed unacceptable by law fall within the ideal and acceptable behaviour according to the culture and vice-versa. Nevertheless, the persistence of graft and corruption in Philippine does not necessarily manifest a legal-cultural conflict since the most problematic form of corruption involves cash payments, which are both not legally and culturally acceptable. If an act is recognized as deviant or corrupt both by law and ethics, the author labeled that act as true corruption.

Here graft has been conceptualized as an individual act when the act is performed by a civil servant or a group of civil servants acting alone without involving any person external to the bureaucracy of compromising the performance of duties of another bureaucrat it is called graft. When the later actions obtain with participants both within and outside the bureaucracy it is called corruption.

Different Types of Corruption:

- **Tong**: Protection money regularly paid by clients to bureaucrats.
- **Lagay or arreglo**: Payment for specific service rendered by the bureaucrat.
- **Retainer**: A kind of relationship where the client practically employs the bureaucrat as an insurance against possible sanctions alter.
- **Favor**: Here only the variable of particularistic role is activated.
- **Individualized Corruption**: It is the actions of an individual who strays from a prevailing norm of official public behaviour.
- **Systematic Corruption**: A situation where the corruption behaviour is itself the prevailing norm and where corruption has become so regularized and institutionalized that organizational supports back wrongdoing and actually penalize those who line up to the old norms.
The bureaucrats were the main actors in all these types of corruption and it occurred in governmental agencies in the Philippines. Davies, D.J. (1987). “Controlling Administrative Corruption” Planning and Administration Journal 14 (2) 1987:62-67.

In this article, an attempt has been made to find out the corruption in local government in England and Wales. As far as local government is concerned the requirement is for political leaders and senior managers to control extent of administrative corruption in their district or authority. Both central and local bureaucracies are pitted against various scales of corruption such as small scale. Individualistic, opportunistic, systematic, group and planned. The author has showed statistics of corruption from 1980-1986.

A variety of approaches has been suggested towards solving the problems of administrative corruption at both central and local levels. At present it is needed to strengthen the financial regulations and audit procedures at local and central levels.


Mujib attempted to create a family-centered political dynasty in Bangladesh for the benefit of his relatives and closest associates at the expense of almost everyone else. His tendency to grant political and financial favours to his relatives was unpopular in Bangladesh. Sheikh Abu Nasser, Mujib's only brother and four sisters were believed to have benefited excessively from his ties of kinship with Mujib. Fifteen people had ministerial rank under Mujib's one party system (BAKSA), 4 of them were Mujib's relatives, 10 of his closest associated and 1 was Mujib himself. No one was allowed to serve in the government without becoming a member of BAKSAL. Bangladeshis were reminded of the corruption and violence of the AL years when 2.7 million taka worth of currency notes and jewellery and several dozen unlicensed firearms and weapons were found in Mujib's house after his assassination.

Zia had never been personality involved in the kinds of familial scandals as Mujib and he had, on a number of occasions, taken legal actions or sacked people at the highest levels on corruption charges. But he is criticized on the corruption issue because he institutionalized what are commonly viewed as corrupt activities. Local units of the BNP were distrusted by people and were frequently singled out as "nests of corruption." Zia and some of his followers tried to use Bangladesh’s newly created village institutions to build centre of influence and parsonage with loyalties only to the BNP. In practice it was entirely possible that a single family or caste group or other set of elites might capture all meaningful local government institutions in a particular village and confine central government parsonage and local developmental benefits to their own circle of followers. Both the army and the bureaucracy accused that there was rampant corruption within the BNP.


This paper has attempted to set out a framework within which the complex issues surrounding corruption may be analyzed in any specific country. It considers the investigation of the determinants of corruption, emphasizing the environment in which corruption evolves - whether shaped by international, national or specific institutional factors - and the manner in which the different parties to corruption interact and organize themselves in conducting these activities.

The paper proposes a general framework for analysing the causes of corruption at the international level, at the national level and within individual institutions. At the international level, the extent to which the competitiveness of international markets gives multinational companies an incentive to offer bribes to gain an advantage on their competitors needs to be considered.

At the national level the basic development strategy of the government affects opportunities and incentives for corruption and three relationships (relationships between government and civil service, between government and judiciary and between government and civil society do the same).

The paper offers three specific areas of government activity as possibilities for considering the sources of corruption at the level of individual institutions, the customs administration, business regulation, and management of foreign aid.
The paper produces several other explanations of corruption based on models with multiple equilibrium, social norms, income distribution and the importance of political leadership.

It also focuses on the importance of corruption for economic development by considering the different forms of corruption and the characteristics of these forms that are most critical for economic activity. The proposed analytical framework should provide useful insights into the problems of corruption and assist in designing appropriate policies.

Finally, the paper reviews the empirical work on corruption that has been undertaken to date in this field.


The practice whereby some public money is illicitly diverted for private gain is present to some degree in all societies. However, corruption’s widespread occurrence in developing countries has raised substantial concern. Developing countries particular circumstance – rapid economic and social change, strong kinship and ethnic ties, new institutions, overlapping and sometimes conflicting views about what is proper public behaviour – appear to contribute to corruption saliency. Government monopoly of economic activities, combined with conditions of political softness, widespread poverty and socio-economic inequalities, ambivalence toward the legitimacy of governmental organizations, and systematic maladministration, may be particularly conducive in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Corruption has a deleterious, often devastating, effect on administrative performance and economic and political development, for example, corroding public confidence, perverting institutions, processes and even goals, favouring the privileged and powerful few, and stimulating legal capital export or use of non-rational criteria in public decisions. Corruption counteraction measures may range from commissions of inquiry, ombudsmen to investigate citizen complaints, courses and seminars, to simplification of administrative and financial procedures. However, their successes will depend on the gradual creation of a political and public climate favouring impartiality and on the wisdom of specific governmental actions.


This book is a compilation of eleven papers written by Indian scholars. These papers have primarily tried to focus on the different aspects of corruption among Indian politicians and administrators and on the remedial measures. It is mentioned that the cancerous spread of corruption in India’s public life has become a matter of grave concern which threatens the political, administrative and economic environment of the country. Though public awareness of this problem has increased over the years, significant progress has not yet been made in terms of developing and designing remedies that can adequately deal with its magnitude and severity. The book emphasizes that corruption in India can only be controlled by systematically reducing the incentives and opportunities for interested persons to engage in corrupt practices. It has suggested four national agenda for corruption control. These are: reforming the political process, restricting and reorienting of the government machinery, empowerment of the citizens and creating sustained public pressure for change.

It is expected that the proposed agenda would stimulate an informed public debate on the subject in the country and encourage both individuals and organizations including the government to initiate action to bring the all pervasive cancer of corruption under control.


The monograph examined prevalent concept about corruption, mostly those articulated in various government documents in order to reach a definition of corruption relevant to Bangladesh. A number of definitions of the term corruption is mentioned without showing preference to any particular one. To ascertain the views of public servants on corruption a questionnaire containing twenty two cases were circulated to them. Eighty six public servants of different levels of seniority returned the questionnaire. Analysis of the completed questionnaire along with definitions of corruption indicated that corruption transcended the legal ambit and in many cases deviant
behaviours were warranted by complexities of the administrative system. A number of issues needed to be looked at carefully to reach a consensus on corruption as a term. Deviation from organizational rules, acquiescing to corrupt demand by uncontrollable parties, indirect influence in decision making, investment in an individual holding office to realise benefit in future are presented as important issues to clearly articulate the meaning of the term corruption.


Immediately after elections, opposition leaders, almost in union, talked about rigging and other forms of irregularities in the electoral process. The opposition political parties cited several cases with reasonable proof that corrupt and irregular practices had been perpetrated by BNP candidates, their supporters and polling agents, and assigned government officials when things turned difficult for ruling party candidates. The rigging charges were given credibility by the ruling party when it went all out to get is candidates returned in the by-elections. Vivid eye witness accounts revealed high-handed irregularities by BNP leaders including ministers and other government functionaries. Opposition leaders alleged that the rigging of the elections was a pre-planned affair and that the ruling party had already decided much ahead of the polls as to the number of opposition members it wanted to have in the parliament.


The Election Commission has failed to play an independent role in the election process. The non-partisan image of the Election Commission is questioned by voters and many political leaders. There have been too many cases in the past in which officials of the Commission provided active assistance to civil servants to manipulate voting results in favour of candidates either belonging to or supported by the ruling party. Independent reports clearly point out several instances of bogus voting, ballot-snatching, violence and perpetuation of corrupt practices by civil servants in collusion with the locally-deputed officials of the Election Commission. All these were intended to alter the popular verdict. The incidence of irregularities and manipulation increased at a frightening rate specially during Ershad’s rule. In fact, during Ershad’s tenure elections became a farce and had been deliberately rigged and least participated.


One of the major focus of the paper is to scrutinize the problems afflicting the civil service of the country. One of the major problems in the civil service is corruption. Corruption has been institutionalized in the civil service. The tentacles of corruption have engulfed the civil servants. The level of corruption varies depending on how influential a position that particular civil servants holds. The civil servants have become accustomed to living a lifestyle far beyond their legal income. The citizens have come to realise the harsh reality that nothing moves without greasing the palms of the relevant officer. This has indeed adversely affected the delivery of services as well as collection of revenue. Besides, the civil service has been vitiated with inefficiency, insubordination, misconduct and misuse of official position.


Ethics and mortality in public service in Bangladesh is very low. Public servants are demonstrating unethical attitude and behaviour. Corruption in Bangladesh is endemic, chronic and pervasive. It is obvious that the political, economic, social, cultural and behavioural factors combine in contributing to corrupt practices and ethical bankruptcy among them. It is also important to observe that absence of accountability and transparency in administration is possibly the single most important factor contributing to the widespread corruption in public services. The long experience with colonial rule, the dominance of civil-military coalitions in post-independence period and lack of democratic institutions and practices have provided fertile ground for bureaucratic corruption to flourish. The inability and unwillingness on the part of the political elite to address the socio-political causes of corruption and to bring unaccountable bureaucracy under political control helped corruption to take a firm root. Even popularly elected representatives are either unwilling or unable to take
effective measures to curb corrupt practices in public services. Many elected officials including members of parliament and ministers are themselves involved in large-scale corruption.


This book focuses on the business-government relationship in Bangladesh. The author analyses the channels of access and influence employed by business to press its demands on government and assesses the overall impact of business on public policy and the political system in Bangladesh. In doing so, the author depicted the politics of patronage and corruption that plagued every government in Bangladesh since liberation.

During the AL period Mujib distributed benefits to AL leaders and followers and they plundered the society in almost every way they could. AL activists received jobs in nationalized industries, grew rich as smugglers, appropriated abandoned Pakistani houses and sold off government permits and licenses to the highest bidders.

During Zia regime corruption was converted from a crime to a habit and corruption became institutionalized. Corruption and misuse of power led to the wasting of almost 40% of the total resources set apart for development. Corruption became so rampant under Sattar that Ershad, invoked it to justify seizing power.

Ershad’s entire government was based on patronage. Benefits were handed out to a favoured few. He attempted to build and maintain support by providing key social groups with tangible rewards. Under Ershad corruption prevailed in every sector of national life and included petty corruption, project corruption and programmatic corruption.

Petty corruption takes many forms. Payments are required simply to obtain in application or a signature, to secure a copy of an approved sanction, to ensure proper services and billing from telephone, natural gas, electric power and water employees. Petty corruption is partly responsible for the high losses suffered by public sector utilities. Public sector employees ignored illegal utility connections, tampered with

meeters and manipulated bills for a fee. As a result Bangladesh utility costs are among the highest in the region and yet the system continues to lose money and there is a continuing battle between the international donor community and the government of Bangladesh over the issue of cost recovery.

Project corruption permeates both public and private sector contracting. A substantial commission must be paid to secure large public sector contracts in Bangladesh. Donor countries and agencies hire local lobbyists who clears their project through the complex maze of project approvals in Bangladesh. No level of bureaucracy will show any interest on the project unless the officer is assured that he will receive some personal benefits.

Programmatic corruption is simply another dimension of the problem. Food for Work Programme is one of the most corrupt programs in Bangladesh. Relief programs are estimated to suffer losses of 80 per cent. As a result donors prefer to channel their relief efforts through NGOs rather than through the bureaucracy.

These three types of corruption in Bangladesh led to a massive gap between policy and implementation. Pervasive corruption distorted the entire economy and contributed to uncompetitive, overpriced goods and sick industries.

Here corruption has been viewed as misuse of power. Political patronage and corruption which plagued Mujib, Zia and Ershad governments in Bangladesh have been taken into account in this book. Corruption have prevailed in every sector of our national life since liberation. It is multi-disciplinary in nature. Except some favoured few all others were victimized by corrupt practices.


Corruption among politicians in power and bureaucracy is openly discussed and is faced as part of daily life by citizens. Most people in Bangladesh feel themselves powerless to address the phenomenon on any particular level. Still others regard it as their inherent right to engage
in corrupt actions in order to supplement meager state salaries. Corruption is viewed as an obstacle to development and a barrier to poor’s access and participation in the decision making and development. It is also agreed that very little systematic research has been done on corruption despite widespread and anecdotal evidence of its extent. The large inflow of aid combined with a weak state have created many opportunities for corruption. Identification and analysis of corruption with a view to developing a strategy for its reduction is also strongly emphasized.


While discussing the economic crisis and political polarization in Bangladesh in 1974, and the fall of the Mujib regime and its aftermath in chapters 8 and 9 of this book the author gives a description of corruption under Mujib and after Mujib in Bangladesh.

After the liberation war the AL government faced the great challenge of building up a viable economy and a stable social and political order. Soon after liberation the government nationalized banks, insurance companies, jute, textile and sugar mills. In most of the nationalized industries, the administrators appointed by the government were AL supporters who grew rich overnight by smuggling machinery and raw materials to India. The distribution of home produced and imported goods were carried on by dealers who were issued permits and licenses. The major portion of permits and licenses were given to AL workers who sold their licenses to professional traders which provided them with unearned income. The sheer logic of the unequal real value between the Bangladeshi taka and Indian rupee encouraged smuggling and there was large-scale smuggling of relief goods, foodstuffs and jute to India. It is well-known that some of the noveau rich crated through the distribution of patronage by the AL government were the ring leaders of the smuggling operations.

Peoples discontent was widespread and AL gradually lost its effectiveness as an organizational weapon because of increasing factionalism within the party. The divisions among the younger party members was more serious. Abdur Razak and Tofael Ahmed led one faction, with a large following in the Students League affiliate of the AL, the other was led by Mujib’s nephew Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, who founded the rival J ubo League. In March 1974, the Razzak-Ahmed group launched a campaign against the “corrupt elements and exploiters of society referring to Moni and his associates in the J ubo League.” Tensions between the two groups resulted in the killing of 7 students on the Dhaka University campus in April 1974.

After Mujib’s assassination, 32 persons – ministers of the Mujib Government, ten MP’s, four civil servants, one educationist and twelve businessmen were arrested on charges of misuse of power and corruption under the martial law regulations.


This paper argues that corruption is a product of self aggrandizement; of unrealistically low remuneration which makes it impossible for public servants to live within their legitimate means; and of a closed political system which inevitably tends to exclude aggregated interests. Corruption leads to loss of much needed revenue and human talent for development, distorts priorities for public policy, and shifts scarce resources away from the public interest. The natural distrust that results among the different sectors of society, and the growth of despondency in the general public, are incompatible with the requirements for successful public policy. The main theme running through the paper is that political instability, corruption and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing. The paper finally outlines some measures that needed to be taken in order to clear the path for sustained growth and development.


This book is on the political corruption of India. The writer says that though political corruption is a favourite topic for informal discussion among people, very little empirical work on this specific topic has been done. He says that the political actors including ministers, legislators, office bearers of political parties and other political office holders all are involved in corruption which caused the erosion
of moral values as well as economic and social life of the country. On the basis of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952, several commissions so far been set up to inquire political corruption in India. The Khana Commission is one of the most important inquiry commissions appointed by the government. The author has taken this commission as his unit of analysis and following the case study method he has tried to discuss the political corruption in India. His observations are: power tends to corrupt; creation of inquiry commission has a common trend to be malafide, intentional and politically-motivated; commissions are least effective in preventing corruption; the commission tend to be a fraud on the state exchequer; follow up actions are hardly taken on the basis of commission's recommendations; and corrupt ministers tend to escape from the clutches of law without being punished.

So to avoid problems, the author suggests that the cases of corruption should go to the courts of law through police instead of the inquiry commission. Special courts may also be established for this very purpose. Otherwise the commissions should be vested with power to punish the corrupt politicians.


In the section IV of this report different issues of corruption have been discussed. According to this report, systematic discussion on corruption is difficult because of definition problems, lack of reliable data, case studies, transparency and organizational ability to handle corruption. Corruption covers such areas as: procurement of goods and services both from home and abroad; administration of taxes and prevention of smuggling; disposal, sale and allotment of government property; administration of loans by public financial institutes; outright embezzlement of government funds; and all kinds of shop floor practices. It has reviewed the section of “Government Malpractice” of the Report of the Task Force of Bangladesh Development Strategies of the 1990. Then operational issues like procedural changes and institutional capability and the legal context for dealing with corruption in Bangladesh have been looked into. It has recommended some remedial measures to remove corruption. One of them is reviving the Anti-Corruption Council to scrutinize cases against senior public servants only. In this connection the report also discussed the status of investigation and disposal of corruption cases from 1990 to 1992 which gives a very poor picture. Other recommendations are performance evaluation of the investigating staff, increasing the number of special judges and above all updating, changing and strengthening the institutional and legal framework. It also suggested measures to make the Bureau of Anti-Corruption effective.


A minor part of this study investigated nature and magnitude of corruption in a particular upazila in Bangladesh. The upazila structure was not only controlled by bureaucrats posted there but were involved in misappropriating public funds for their own interest. The opinion survey conducted showed how and when a specific corrupt practice such as bribery takes place. Villagers had to bribe government officials either to by-pass certain access encounters or to speed up the process of service delivery. In this practice, the dalal (middleman) played a critical role. With the increase in the ratio of public service expenditure cases of mismanagement and corruption also went up. The three case studies that the author prepared indicated that bureaucrats control over massive financial resources without proper accountability and self-seeking nature of bureaucrats were principal contributing factors to the growth of corruption at the local government level.


This book probes into the attitudinal dimensions of the administrative elite in Bangladesh towards various issues related to development process. In this connection, the author provides, on the basis of empirical research, an attitudinal description towards political and administrative corruption.

Politicians and administrators are joint partners in the running of the state. If is beleived that a political cannot get things done of his own
interest without corruption the civil servant and the civil servant also
places upon him demands in return that reward him materially
otherwise.

Corruption is often attributed to political parties in power in the
developing countries. In Bangladesh every military coup would justify
its legitimacy under this plea. The first military coup was justified on
the ground of failure of Mujib government on the economic front on
account of large-scale corruption among party members. A large majority
of party men and Mujib's family members and relatives were involved
in blatant cases of corruption. Similar complaints of corruption were
also made by the press about BNP. During Zia's regime corruption
became a “fact of life.” He thought of controlling corruption but not of
completely eradicating it from society as he considered it was not
possible to do so at that stage. While Ershad captured power he said
that he would wage a jihad against conspicuous corruption that had
sapped the whole politics – administrative fabric of the country. But he
along with his ministers and Jatiya Party members were involved in
massive corruption.

Level : Problems of Access and Participation” in N.A. Siddiquee,
Decentralization and Development : Theory and Practice in
Bangladesh. Dhaka : University of Dhaka.

The principal focus of the chapter is on politics of patronage and
corruption in the delivery of local services. Evidence showed that
 provision of increased resources at the upazila level and transfer of
authority to allocate and utilize such resources to local council
provided considerable opportunities for local level elected politicians
and bureaucrats to make gain for themselves, their relatives and friends.
An overwhelming majority (39%) respondents interviewed by the author
held the view that corruption increased significantly since the
introduction of upazila system of decentralization. Most respondents
felt that upazila council was the nerve centre of corruption, nepotism
and patronage networks. Not surprisingly upazila level decisions were
influenced more by factors like kinship, social and political relationship
rather than pursuit of development objectives and adherence to formal
and impersonal rules and regulations. The author’s fieldwork showed
that upazila councils in study areas extended their patronage networks
by i) distributing various construction tenders and work orders to their
relatives, friends and political allies; ii) leasing out hats, bazaars and
jal mahals to their chosen parties; iii) issuing these same people with
licences and permits, and iv) selecting the members of their own lobby
for various project committees.


According to the author one of the most crucial prerequisite of good
governance is the minimization of corruption in the government
machinery. But unfortunately over the years corruption has increased
and the wealth acquired through corruption has a general tendency to
go out of the country. He emphasized that political will and powerful
regulatory measures are to be exercised to minimize corruption. People’s
voting rights and constant vigilance may play important role also. The
author disagrees on the issue of changing the prevailing anti corruption
laws rather emphasizes on their effective implementation. He also gave
six suggestions to make the Bureau of Anti-Corruption efficient.

Making in a Dependent Regime” in H.M. Zafarullah, et. al. eds. Policy

In this chapter administrative corruption in Bangladesh has been
discussed from economic point of view. It has emphasized the
deleterious effects of inefficiency and corruption among public officials.
According to the author the most common form of corruption in political
and administrative sector is pecuniary bribes. The methods through
which bribes could be extracted are: non-economic or coercive and
economic or non-coercive. The money earned by corruption are mostly
spent on consumption or in investments outside the country. It also
leads to the misappropriation of a large part of the competitive revenue.
This ultimately leads to payment of huge subsidies by the government.
It is mentioned here that the government treasury loses about three
times the amount of revenue it collects because of corrupt practices.
This chapter has also indicated some measures to reduce the countries
dependence on foreign aid by decorrupting the public sector.
The basic argument of this book is that the phenomenon of political corruption – the illegal use of public office for private gain – can be understood only against a background of social and economic change.

Theobald prefers to view corruption as perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge public duties by bribery or favour; the use or existence of corrupt practices.

Both the negative and positive sides of corruption is reviewed. While arguing the positive side he mentioned that corruption is believed to promote economic growth and political development. The two are of course closely interrelated: economic growth is crucial if a government is to maintain legitimacy in the face of increased mass mobilization that rapid social change produces. Corruption is believed to promote economic growth in the following ways: it assists in capital formation; it fosters entrepreneurial abilities; it allows business interests to penetrate the bureaucracy and it permits the logic of the market to intimate itself into transactions from which public controls exclude it.

Political development has four basic ingredients: enhanced administrative capacity, the development of political parties, mass participation and national integration.

Those who would emphasize the negative side of corruption maintain that it impedes rather than promotes economic growth, stifles entrepreneurialism as well as squandering of scarce national resources. And far from political development, corruption leads to serious political decay in that it weakens administrative capacity and undermines democracy, stability and national integration.

Theobald identified a number of remedial measures to control corruption. First, is the attempt to drive out corruption by means of usually one-off purges or campaigns. The idea here is that an immediate and powerful offensive is needed not only to punish wrong-doers but to serve as a lesson to authors.

A second strategy is one that bases itself on the setting-up of anti-corruption boards, commissions and the like, which subject the administrative apparatus to more or less permanent scrutiny investigating specific cases of abuse as they are revealed.

Third, we encounter not so much a strategy but more an ethos associated particularly with military regimes and which locates the root of corruption in politics and the antics of politicians. The antidote is, therefore, conceived in terms of severely constricting if not the curtailing of the political context, effectively inaugurating a process of depoliticisation.

Fourth, and again more of an ethics, situates the abuse of office within the larger problem of a general social malaise, a kind of moral vacuum or anomie the remedy for which is some form of moral regeneration or moral re-armament.

Fifth, is the long established tradition which sees corruption as fundamentally the abuse of power and accordingly looks to the strengthening of the checks on the abuse of power, the enhancement of the accountability of the powerful as the principal means of combating the phenomenon.

Lastly, the only effective way of dealing with this abuse is to drastically reduce the opportunities for corrupt transactions. This is to be achieved primarily by cutting back on the state's activities, a strategy which is supposed to be particularly appropriate for underdeveloped countries with their over-expanded public sectors.

Corruption is deeply rooted in the psychological and social structures of the countries where it is allegedly prevalent. Consequently, its elimination cannot be realistically anticipated until certain fundamental changes have taken place. The most important of these are the rise of predominance of universalistic norms, the emergence of new centres of power outside the bureaucracy and the development of competitive party politics. Such changes, however, can come about only after a long period of social and economic development.

Corruption in Government is perceived as the abuse of public power and authority for private and other group gains. It is a complex, multifaceted social phenomenon with various manifestations. Forms of corruption include acceptance of money or other rewards for awarding contracts, violation of procedures to advance personal interests, kickbacks from development programs or multi-national corporations, pay-offs for legislative support, diversion of public resources for private use, overlooking illegal activities, intervening in the justice process, nepotism, common theft, overpricing, establishing non-existing projects, tax collection and tax assessment frauds. Systemic impunity is the underlying element of the various forms of corruption.

Corruption takes place as result of inadequacies in existing public management systems as well as social, cultural, political and economic factors. Causes of corruption include the persistence of traditional values and cultural approaches, poverty, ignorance and lack of knowledge about individual entailments, greed, patronage, communal bonds and kingship ties, the asymmetry of relationships favouring those in control of state power, economic shortages in which public officials assume extra-ordinary control over scarce goods and services. The absence of administrative/legal regulations and a morass of rules open to manipulation provide opportunities for corruption.

Consequences of corruption vary from country to country. It has been identified as a major detrimental factor in the economic malaise, government performance, public resources and general morale in the public service in some countries. The overwhelming view is that the effects of corruption on administrative efficiency and economic performance is negative. Continuing corruption lead to perpetuation of social and economic inequalities and jeopardise administrative reform and accountability.

Several countries have set up independent institutional arrangements to deal with corruption such as Ombudsman, Vigilance Commissions, Inspectors General and Independent Auditors. These institutions have been effective to some extent in mitigating corrupt practices and behaviour, but have not always been in themselves sufficient to control corruption in government. Corruption has become systematic and way of life in many countries. The problem is more serious at high political levels than in the bureaucracy. Once it persists at the political level. It is difficult to control at the bureaucratic level.

The seminar recognised that positive social attitudes, improving educational procedures, supporting the role of the media, a code of public ethics, transparency and openness in government, increased level of accountability of public officials are important in presenting corruption.

Basic ways of fighting corruption are – administrative reforms, preventative structure and prosecuting techniques. Combating corruption requires a long term view. A meaningful solution can be found through administrative reforms at the policy, institutional and process levels.


The subject of this study is political corruption in Ghana. This book includes a brief political history of Ghana, definition and culture of political corruption, the growth of political corruption between 1938 and 1966 in Ghana and a brief examination of some of the causes and consequences of corruption in Ghana.

Political corruption is defined by the author as the unscheduled, unsanctioned use of public political resources and or goods for private, that is, non public ends.

The author’s description of how the corruption process works is fascinating. For example, the reader learns that in one ministry bribe money is divided up as follows: 50% to the minister, 20% to the junior ministers, 10% to go-between, 10% to the secretary of the political party involved and the rest to an open cash fund kept by the minister for expenses like paying informers within the ministry, providing gifts to influential visitors, and maintaining attractive women around the office.

The author says corruption has become a political problem in Ghana under conditions of varying circumstances of time, place and prevailing norms. He identifies the following causes of corruption: traditional contexts and the effects of colonialism; the “new men” in the conquest of political power; and bureaucratic transitions and growth of corruption.

The author suggests that one cause of corruption is a huge unwieldy government. In a hopelessly tangled governmental structure corruption
is often the only way to get things done, and by 1965 the Ghanian government had become an administrative jungle of ministries, boards and independent agencies.

Another cause is that the most of new bureaucrats brought into government after independence has been promised the seemingly limitless powers and prerogatives enjoyed by the British and colonial elite. But they did not feel the retraining bureaucratic norms of the colonial elite, as well as the older traditional curbs on the abuse of office.

Waste of resources, instability and reduction of governmental capacity are the three broad categories of consequences of political corruption in the Ghanian case as identified by the author.

As well as presenting a case study, the book develops a general model of corruption. The model postulates that political corruption in Ghana a ‘core process’, applicable to all cases of political corruption and an ‘extended process’ limited to Ghana and selected other states with a similar political environment.

Waste of resources, instability and reduction of governmental capacity are the three broad categories of consequences of political corruption in the Ghanian case as identified by the author.


In this report it is stated that the corruption is a reflection of the existing behavioral patterns and social values and norms of a society. In Bangladesh corruption is present in almost all levels of the government from the earlier period of non-democratic rule, till now. Different reasons for public corruption have been given like the nature of the regulatory environment, lack of transparency in government, the influence of powerful business interest groups, low salaries of public servants, weakness in the legal framework, the self-sustaining cycle of corruption etc. It also attempted to quantify the cost of corruption. Different innovative measures to fight corruption taken by different countries like Chile, Singapore and Australia are mentioned as examples. Discussing remedial measures this report emphasizes that in Bangladesh powerful politicians and bureaucrats can never be prosecuted when they are on the job. Lastly, the report has suggested some specific and general actions to overcome the problem of corruption. These are: formulating medium-term program to combat corruption; initiating a public awareness campaign; increasing citizens access to information about government policies and decisions; replacing the Official Secrets Act; increasing civil service compensation package; and introducing judicial reviews and establishment of an office of ombudsman.